As such, the Treaty Period variable builds on the Depth variable by providing more fine-grained data on treaty dates. Note that in a multi-party system some parties may converge further towards the center while others diverge. See Stanig for an account of the non-monotonic properties of aggregate polarization measures in multi-party systems.
As a robustness check, we run the model replacing the Trend variable with the Treaty Period categorical variable and dropping decade fixed effects. Our key results remain qualitatively unchanged. The inclusion of this interaction term mitigates any potential effects of spurious correlation see, e.
The results Table A. Figure A.
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The latter effect was especially more pronounced in the latest waves of EU enlargement , , , where the acquis was thicker and accession countries had to make up a lot more ground. That being said, non-European countries are potentially subject to a softer graded membership treatment effect in the form of trade and association agreements.
We are not able to present results for the newest EU members — namely, Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia — as the post-event amount of observations in our data set is very limited. Results from other Visegrad countries, such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia, exhibit equally clear and well-balanced trends and are available from the authors upon request.
In the case of Austria, however, this breaking point seems to occur sooner due to idiosyncratic reasons such as the cumulative impact of early waves of immigration. In fact, the recent trend toward the use of EU referendums may be viewed as an effort to bolster the input legitimacy of representative government by means of mechanisms of direct democracy. Skip to main content Skip to sections. Advertisement Hide. Download PDF. The effects of supranational integration on party-system polarization. Open Access. First Online: 10 May That is, in the absence of any other changes in the institutional set-up e.
Thus, this trade-off will be reflected by some limited convergence towards the center of the policy space up the point where spatial transportation costs net of vote share gains are zero see Fig. Open image in new window. In Fig. The two-tailed ninety-five percent confidence intervals around the line indicate the areas in which this effect is statistically significant.
Accordingly, party-system polarization extremism decreases up to the point where an association agreement between a country and the EU enters into force. In Model 1, we use the wider data set, which includes data on all twenty-eight EU current member-states. Model 2 restricts the analysis to the EU and the pre-crisis period up until in order to verify that this is not simply a story about the effects of the Global Financial and Eurozone Debt Crises. The results are robust to this restricted sample. Finally, in Models 6 and 7, we estimate the model with the Polarization variable derived from the Dalton index.
We estimate an ordinary least squares OLS model with country fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by countries. Our specification assumes that observations are not independent within clusters although they may be independent between clusters. The interaction term coefficient is both positive and significant at the one percent level. Model 2 shows the regression results after controlling for GDP Growth. Model 3 includes the additional controls EMU and Single Market , which are coded as dummy variables taking the value of one only in years when EMU and the Single Market respectively were in effect.
Of these two variables, only Single Market is found to exert a negative and significant effect on party-level extremism. Models replicate the earlier regressions but cluster standard errors by election. Estimated coefficients as well as their significance levels are similar to those in the previous models.
Model 7 estimates Model 2 using bootstrapped standard errors. The results again remain unchanged. More specifically, the effect is negative and statistically significant for the first eighteen years since the Treaty of Rome As time passes, the effect becomes positive and statistically significant after the first forty-three years from the creation of the European Communities EC and continues to increase with time.
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A widening negative difference or a narrowing positive difference between these trend lines is interpreted as a negative effect of supranational integration on party-system polarization; on the other hand, a narrowing negative difference or a widening positive difference is interpreted as a positive effect of supranational integration on party-system polarization. In the remainder of this section, we study the impact of EMU membership on domestic party systems as we expect distinctive effects generated by an ever deeper form of supranational integration and policy coordination. The EMU effectively amounts to a subunion of the EU as it consists of EU member-states that chose to adopt a common currency, thereby relinquishing control over their monetary policy and further coordinating their fiscal policies.
In all five cases, where matching of pre-event trends against those of artificial countries seems to work well, we once again detect a U-shaped effect of EMU accession on party-system extremism as captured by the MDP measure. To a large extent, the non-monotonic effect reflects the Eurozone Debt Crisis political backlash both in terms of increased conditionality for debtor countries and bailout disbursements for creditor countries.
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The effects of alternative power-sharing arrangements: Do moderating institutions moderate party strategies and government policy outputs?. Public Choice , , — Micco, A. The currency union effect on trade: Early evidence from EMU. In , Epstein pleaded guilty to a charge of soliciting prostitution from an underage girl, as part of a lenient deal with federal prosecutors in Florida.
He served 13 months of an month prison sentence, much of it on day release. That plea deal came under renewed scrutiny in recent months following a series of articles published by the Miami Herald, leading to new charges being filed against Epstein by federal prosecutors in New York. Ito did not immediately respond to requests for comment. Epstein killed himself in jail on 10 August while awaiting trial on sex trafficking charges.
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